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Abstract
Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we
study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied
to tax evasion on Stauffer-Hohnisch-Pittnauer (SHP) networks. To
control the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model pro-
posed by Zaklan, MVM is applied in the neighborhood of the criti-
cal noise qc to evolve the Zaklan model. The Zaklan model had been
studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model. Here we show that
the Zaklan model is robust because this can be studied besides using
equilibrium dynamics of Ising model also through the nonequilibrium
MVM and on various topologies giving the same behavior regardless
of dynamic or topology used here.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, Sociophysics, Majority vote, Nonequi-
librium.
1 Introduction
The Ising model [1, 2] has become a excellent tool to study other models
of social application. The Ising model was already applied decades ago to
explain how a school of fish aligns into one direction for swimming [3] or
how workers decide whether or not to go on strike [4]. In the Latane´ model
of Social Impact [5] the Ising model has been used to give a consensus, a
fragmentation into many different opinions, or a leadership effect when a few
people change the opinion of lots of others. To some extent the voter model
of Liggett [6] is a zero-temperature Ising-type model: opinions follow the
majority of the neighbourhood, similar to Schelling [7], all these cited models
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and others can be found out in [8]. Already Fo¨llmer (1974) [9] applied the
Ising model to economics.
The tax evasion remains to be a major predicament facing governments
[10, 11, 12, 13]. Experimental evidence provided by Ga¨chter [14] indeed sug-
gests that tax payers tend to condition their decision regarding whether to
pay taxes or not on the tax evasion decision of the members of their group.
Frey and Torgler [15] also provide empirical evidence on the relevance of con-
ditional cooperation for tax morale. Following the same context, recently,
Zaklan et al. [16, 17] developed an economics model to study the problem
of tax evasion dynamics using the Ising model through Monte-Carlo simula-
tions with the Glauber and heatbath algorithms (that obey detailed-balance
equilibrium) to study the proposed model.
Grinstein et al. [18] have argued that nonequilibrium stochastic spin
systems on regular square lattices with up-down symmetry fall into the uni-
versality class of the equilibrium Ising model [18]. This conjecture was con-
firmed for various Archimedean lattices and in several models that do not
obey detailed balance [19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The majority-vote model (MVM)
is a nonequilibrium model proposed by M.J. Oliveira in 1992 and defined by
stochastic dynamics with local rules and with up-down symmetry on a regular
lattice shows a second-order phase transition with critical exponents β, γ, ν
which characterize the system in the vicinity of the phase transition identical
[22, 24] with those of the equilibrim Ising model [1] for regular lattices. Lima
et al. [25] studied MVM on VD random lattices with periodic boundary con-
ditions. These lattices posses natural quenched disorder in their connections.
They showed that the presence of quenched connectivity disorder is enough
to alter the exponents β/ν and γ/ν from the pure model and therefore is a
relevant term to such non-equilibrium phase-transition in disagreement with
the arguments of Grinstein et al. [18]. Recently, simulations on both undi-
rected and directed scale-free networks [26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33], random
graphs [45, 46] and social networks [47, 48, 49], have attracted interest of
researchers from various areas. These complex networks have been studied
extensively by Lima et al. in the context of magnetism (MVM, Ising, and
Potts model) [50, 51, 36, 52, 53, 54], econophysics models [17, 55, 56] and
sociophysics model [57, 58].
In the present work, we study the behavior of the tax evasion on SHP
networks using the dynamics of MVM, furthermore add a policy makers’s tax
enforcement mechanism consisting of two components: a probability of an
audit each person is subject to in every period and a length of time detected
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tax evaders remain honest. We aim here is to extend the study of Zaklan
et al. [16, 17], which illustrates how different levels of enforcement affect
the tax evasion over time, to dynamics of MVM as an alternative model
of nonequilibrium to the Ising model that is capable of reproduce the same
results for analysis and control of the tax evasion fluctuations. Then, we show
that the Zaklan model is very robust for equilibrium and nonequilibrium
models and also for various topologies used here. We show that the choice of
using the Ising (equilibrium dynamics) or MVM (nonequilibrium dynamics)
used to evolve the Zaklan model is irrelevant, because the results obtained
in this work are about the same for both Ising and MVM. The Zaklan model
also is robust, because it works on SHP network. We show that for this
topology the Zaklan model reaches our objective, that is, to control the tax
evasion of a country (Germany and others). This does not occur with other
models as Axelrod-Ross model for evolution of ethnocentrism [57], because
the results are different depending of the topology of the network. The Ising
model also is not robust, because on directed Baraba´si-Albert network there
is no phase transition present as also on directed SL, 3D, 4D and directed
hypercubic lattices [33]. As described above, the MVM was proposed by
M.J. Oliveira in 1992 [22] in order to improve the criterion of Grinstein et
al. [18], initially described above. In the order to achieve his goal he used
44 (SL) Archimedean lattice. However, also with the aim to improve this
criterion other researchers studied MVM on several other topologies that are
not Archimedeans [34, 25, 51, 35, 51, 37, 38]. To their surprise all results
obtained for the critical exponents are different from results obtained by M.J.
Oliveira, and are also different for each topology used. Pereira et al. [35] then
concluded that MVM has different universality classes which depend only on
the topology used, and that all have one thing in common that is their
2β/ν + γ/ν = Deff effective dimension, obtained by critical exponents for
each topology used, equals Deff = 1. Here, we show that the Zaklan model
behavior is similar for all topologies or dynamics studied here. Therefore,
we believe that this model is very robust, different from the other models
cited above. Galam [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44] introduced for the first time local
majority rules in social systems to the field of sociophysics using discrete
opinion models. Here, we also hope to introduce for the first time the use of
MVM to the field of sociophysics or econophysics using discrete opinions as
in the Zaklan model. Therefore, we do not live in a social equilibrium, any
rumor or gossip can lead to a government or market chaos and we believe
that nothing is better than a nonequilibrium model (MVM) to explain events
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of nonequilibrium. The difference of this work compared to previous studies
using the Zaklan’s model this is the application on the social networks that
follow the prescription of Hohnisch bonds of SHP networks [49].
Hohnisch bonds of SHP [49] are links connecting nodes with different
values (spins, opinions, ...) on them; they are at each time step with a low
probability 0.0001 replaced by a link to another randomly selected node.
Links connecting agreeing nodes are not replaced. In the present work we
start with each node having links to four randomly selected neighbors. All
links are directed.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we
present the Zaklan model evolving with dynamics of MVM. In section 3 we
make an analysis of tax evasion dynamics with the Zaklan model on two-
dimensional square lattices using MVM for their temporal evolution under
different enforcement regimes; we discuss the results obtained. In section 4
we show that MVM also is capable to control the different levels of the tax
evasion analysed in section 3, as it was made by Zaklan et al. [17] using Ising
models. We use the enforcement mechanism cited above on SHP network, we
discuss the resulting tax evasion dynamics. Finally in section 5 we present
our conclusions about the study of the Zaklan model using MVM. Results
for different topologies (directed and undirected Baraba´si-Albert networks,
simple square lattices) were given in [56].
2 Zaklan model
On SHP networks each site of the network is inhabited, at each time step, by
an agent with ”voters” or spin variables σ taking the values +1 representing
an honest tax payer, or −1 trying to at least partially escape her tax duty.
Here is assumed that initially everybody is honest. Each period individuals
can rethink their behavior and have the opportunity to become the opposite
type of agent they were in previous period. In each time period the system
evolves by a single spin-flip dynamics with a probability wi given by
wi(σ) =
1
2
[
1− (1− 2q)σiS
( ki∑
δ=1
σi,δ
)]
, (1)
where S(x) is the sign ±1 of x if x 6= 0, S(x) = 0 if x = 0, and the
summation runs over all ki nearest-neighbour sites σi,δ of σi. In this model
an agent assumes the value ±1 depending on the opinion of the majority of its
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neighbors. The control noise parameter q plays the role of the temperature in
equilibrium systems and measures the probability of aligning σi antiparallel
to the majority of its neighbors σi,δ. Then various degrees of homogeneity
regarding either opinion are possible. An extremely homogenous group is
entirely made either of honest people or of tax evaders, depending of the
sign S(x) of the majority of neighbhors. If S(x) of the neighbors is zero the
agent σi will be honest or evader in the next time period with probability
1/2. We further introduce a probability of an efficient audit (p). Therefore,
if tax evasion is detected, the agent must remain honest for a number k of
time steps. Here, one time step is one sweep through the entire network.
3 Controlling the tax evasion dynamics
In order to calculate the rate of tax evaders, we use the equation below,
tax evasion =
[
N −Nhonest
]
/N, (2)
where N is the total number and Nhonest the honest number of agents. The
tax evasion is calculated at every time step t of system evolution; one time
step is one sweep through the entire network.
Here, we first will present the baseline case k = 0, i.e., no use of enforce-
ment, at q = 0.95qc and with N = 400 sites for SHP network. All simulation
are performed over 20, 000 time steps, as shown in Fig. 1. For very low
noises the part of autonomous decisions almost completely disappears. The
individuals then base their decision solely on what most of their neighbours
do. A rising noise has the opposite effect. Individuals then decide more
autonomously. For MVM it is known that for q > qc, half of the people
are honest and the other half cheat, while for q < qc either one opinion or
the other opinion dominates. Because of this behavior we set at fixed ”Social
Temperature” (q) to some values slightly below qc, where the case that agents
distribute in equal proportions onto the two alternatives is excluded. Then
having set the noise parameter q close to qc = 0.116 on the SHP network,
we vary the degrees of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50) and audit probability
rate (p = 0.5%, 10% and 90%). Therefore, if tax evasion is detected, the en-
forcement mechanism (p) and the period time of punishment k are triggered
in order to control the tax evasion level. The punished individuals remain
honest for a certain number k of periods, as explained before in section 2.
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Figure 1: Baseline case for SHP network. We use q = 0.95qc on SHP networks
and perform all simulation over 20, 000 time steps, also in the later figures.
In Fig. 1 we plot the baseline case k = 0, i.e., no use of enforcement, for
the SHP for dynamics of the tax evasion over 20, 000 time steps. Although
everybody is honest initially, it is impossible to predict roughly which level
of tax compliance will be reached at some time step in the future.
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Figure 2: The SHP networks of tax evasion with various degrees of enforce-
ment.
Figure 2 illustrates different simulation settings for SHP networks, for
each considered combination of degree of punishment (k = 1, 10 and 50)
and audit probability (p = 0.5%, 10% and 90%), where the tax evasion
is plotted over 20,000 time steps. Here we show that even a very small
level the enforcement (p = 0.5% and k = 1) suffices to reduce fluctuations
in tax evasion and to establish mainly compliance. Both a rise in audit
probability (greater p) and a higher penalty (greater k) work to flatten the
time series of tax evasion and to shift the band of possible non-compliance
values towards more compliance. However, the simulations show that even
extreme enforcement measures (p = 90% and k = 50) cannot fully solve the
problem of tax evasion.
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Figure 3: Tax evasion for different enforcement regimes SHP Network and
for degrees of punishment k = 0, 1, 10 and 50 and audit probability p =
0.0%, 0.5%, 4.5%, and 90%.
In Fig. 3 we plot tax evasion for SHP network with N = 400, again
for different enforcement k = 0, k = 1, 10, and 50, but now with audit
probability p = 0.0%, p = 0.5%, p = 4.5%, and p = 90%. For case (a) we
plot the baseline case k = 0, i.e., no use of enforcement for SHP networks
and parameters as in Fig. 1. As everybody is honest initially, it is impossible
to predict which level of tax compliance will be reached at some time step in
the future. For case (b) we show the tax evasion level decreases with audit
probability increasing to p = 0.5% even for small of punishment k = 1 . In
the case (c) we show the tax evasion level decreases, on SHP network, for a
more realistic set of possible values degrees of punishment k = 10 and audit
probability p = 4.5% [14, 58, 16]. In the case (d) we also show tax evasion
level decreases much more for an extreme set of punishment k = 50 and audit
probability p = 90% [14, 16].
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Figure 4: Tax evasion for different enforcement regimes SHP Network and
for degrees of punishment k = 0, 1, 10 and 50 and audit probability p =
0.0%, 0.5%, 4.5%, and 90%. Now differently from our earlier figures we use
N = 4, 000 sites (nodes) of SHP network.
In Fig. 4 we plot tax evasion for SHP network with N = 4, 000 (and not
N = 400 as for the figures before), again for the same parameters studied in
the Fig. 3. Therefore, in Fig. 4 we showed that also for large networks with
4, 000 nodes and 50, 000 time steps, studied here, the control of tax evasion
is achieved by increasing k and/or p.
4 Conclusion
Wintrobe and Ge¨rxhani [58] explain the observed higher level of tax evasion
in generally less developed countries with a lower amount of trust that people
have in governmental institutions. To study this problem Zaklan et al. [16,
17] proposed a model, called here the Zaklan model, using Monte Carlo
simulations and a equilibrium dynamics (Ising model) on square lattices.
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Their results are good agreement with analytical and experimental results
obtained by [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58]. In this work we show that the
Zaklan model is very robust for analysis and control of tax evasion, because
we use a nonequilibrium dynamics (MVM) to simulate the Zaklan model,
that is the opposite of the study done by [16, 17] equilibrium dynamics (Ising
model), and also on various topologies [56]. Our results are similar to the
results obtained by Zaklan et al. [16, 17] regardless of dynamic or topology.
As we do not live in a social equilibrium and any rumor or gossip can lead
to a government or market chaos, we believe that a non-equilibrium model
(MVM) explains better events of non-equilibrium. Therefore, as the Zaklan
model is a sociophysics and econophysics model, we also believe that the
best topology used for simulations of this model are until now the undirected
Baraba´si-Albert and SHP Social networks.
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